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Outbreaks associated with distinct strains of
Salmonella enterica serotype Uganda, a rare serotype,
occurred in New York City and Chicago during the summer
of 2001. Both outbreaks were linked to eating ready-to-eat
pork products. This serotype may emerge as a more fre-
quent cause of human infections. 
S
almonella enterica serotype Uganda (S. Uganda) is
rarely isolated from humans in the United States. From
1993 to 2000, a median of 48 human isolates per year (1),
and no foodborne disease outbreaks were reported (2). In
August 2001, the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene posted an alert on the Epidemic
Information Exchange (Epi-X), a national, Web-based
communications network for public health investigation
and response (3), regarding its investigation of an outbreak
of S. Uganda infections. Upon detection of a similar clus-
ter in Chicago, the Chicago Department of Public Health
notified New York City’s health department, and the two
agencies discussed methods and results. 
The two cities’ health departments interviewed case-
patients with standardized questionnaires, conducted sani-
tary inspections of implicated food service establishments,
interviewed and tested food workers, and analyzed food
and environmental samples. Outbreak isolates were com-
pared by molecular typing with pulsed-field gel elec-




On July 18, 2001, the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene received a complaint of illness
from a person who ate at a wedding celebration on July 14;
S. Uganda was isolated from the stool of another wedding
attendee. By early August, a distinct strain of S. Uganda
had been isolated from 11 New York City residents with
illness onsets occurring June 24–August 4 (Figure 1). All
11 case-patients were of Hispanic ethnicity, and 6 of 10
interviewed reported having eaten roast pork from a New
York City restaurant in the 3 days before illness onset.
Additionally, roast pork from that restaurant had been
served at the wedding named in the initial consumer com-
plaint. A sample of leftover roast pork from the wedding
was positive for the same strain of S. Uganda as the one
isolated from patients.
Preparation of the roast pork at the restaurant consisted
of seasoning 30–40 lb of raw pork in buckets with salt,
pepper, oregano, and garlic. The pork was subsequently
cooked in an oven for 2 h at 500°F (260°C), then for 1 to
2 h more at 350°F (177°C). After being cooked, the pork
was stored in a hot-holding unit at the front of the restau-
rant and cut into pieces upon request.
At the time of a sanitary inspection initiated by the con-
sumer complaint, raw pork was held at inadequate temper-
atures at the restaurant, and thermometers were
inadequately used during cooking and hot-holding.
Potential sources of cross-contamination, surfaces and
wiping cloths, were not properly sanitized. The same S.
Uganda strain found in patients was isolated from a cooked
pork sample collected from the restaurant on July 18. Raw
pork sampled at that time was positive for Salmonella, but
not S. Uganda. The restaurant was closed on August 6 and
reopened on September 26, after food safety violations
were corrected and pork samples were confirmed negative
for Salmonella.
Chicago
From August 22 to 23, 2001, the Chicago Department
of Public Health received reports of four isolates of S.
Uganda obtained from Chicago residents. By early
September, 12 confirmed cases of S. Uganda infection had
been identified in Chicago with stool collection dates from
August 13 to September 6. All 12 patients were of
Hispanic ethnicity, and each reported having eaten carnitas
(fried pieces of pork) in the 3 days before illness onset.
Carnitas were the only food item reported to have been
eaten by all the patients. For 10 (83%) patients, the source
of the carnitas was a Chicago grocery store. Of the two
patients who did not identify that grocery, one had bought
carnitas from a mobile lunch truck located outside of
his workplace; the source of these carnitas could not be
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Preparation of carnitas at the Chicago grocery consist-
ed of cutting 90 lbs. of raw pork into 15 cm x 15 cm x
10 cm slabs, frying them in pork lard for 2.5 h, and adding
salt and lemon juice 15 min before the end of frying.
Cooked carnitas were then chopped, shredded into small-
er pieces, and placed in a hot holding tray on top of the
meat cooler. Using tongs, a customer would place carnitas
into a Styrofoam container, then hand it to a butcher for
weighing.
No Salmonella was isolated from samples of cooked
carnitas, raw pork, the holding tray, or the serving tongs
obtained from the Chicago grocery on August 24. S.
Uganda was isolated from stool from 1 of 10 butchers. He
reported having worked while having a mild gastrointesti-
nal illness around August 15 and said he frequently ate car-
nitas from the Chicago grocery. The infected butcher was
restricted from work until two consecutive stool speci-
mens, collected 48 h apart, were negative for Salmonella.
The workers and grocery manager were advised to avoid
contact with food when sick.
The investigation of the Chicago grocery showed that
processed meats were being stored at improper tempera-
tures and that potential sources of cross-contamination
were not controlled (i.e., cutting boards and utensils were
inadequately sanitized, and the same scale was used for
raw meats as well as cooked pork). Methods of preventing
cross-contamination after cooking were stressed. Upon
reinspection, the violations had been corrected.
Comparison of the outbreak isolates by PFGE showed
a three-band difference (Figure 2). The sources of the pork
implicated in the outbreaks were traced to two separate
distributors; a more extensive traceback (i.e., to the pack-
ing-plant or farm source) was not conducted. 
Conclusions
We report temporally associated outbreaks of S.
Uganda that likely resulted from eating contaminated
ready-to-eat pork products. Including those obtained from
outbreak patients in New York City and Chicago, 96 iso-
lates of S. Uganda were obtained from human sources in
the United States in 2001 (1). This number was the highest
reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
in the past decade. This finding is consistent with a previ-
ously reported trend toward increased incidence of this
serotype; despite an overall downward trend in rates of
Salmonella infections in the United States, from 1987 to
1997, S. Uganda had the eighth highest annual percentage
increase in human isolates during this period (5). The out-
breaks and these data may signal the emergence of S.
Uganda as a serotype more frequently associated with
human infections in the United States.
Despite the rare occurrence of S. Uganda and the tem-
poral association and epidemiologic similarity of the out-
breaks, molecular analysis of the outbreak isolates
suggested that the New York City and Chicago illnesses
were not linked to a common source. The outbreak isolates
were also distinguishable from S. Uganda clinical isolates
posted on the PulseNet Web board in 2001, which indi-
cates a low likelihood that a multijurisdictional common-
source  S. Uganda outbreak had occurred. While this
serotype is not among the 10 most common Salmonella
serotypes found in swine carcasses or raw ground pork (6),
it is routinely isolated from swine sources (1). Random
sample of S. Uganda isolates obtained from swine in 2001
from the National Veterinary Services Laboratory were
distinguishable from the outbreak isolates by PFGE. These
findings imply heterogeneity in the PFGE patterns of S.
Uganda isolates and suggest that molecular analysis is a
useful tool to assess the relatedness of different strains for
outbreak investigations. 
Of 357 Salmonella foodborne disease outbreaks report-
ed from 1993 to 1997, the vehicle of transmission was
classified as pork in 4 (1.1%) outbreaks, a proportion
lower than that of beef (3.9%), chicken (1.6%), and turkey
(1.6%) (7). Nonetheless, Salmonella organisms may be
present on an estimated 5%–10% of market hog carcasses
after slaughter (8), and the outbreaks described here high-
light the potential for Salmonella transmission to humans
through cooked pork. First, the implicated establishments
in New York City and Chicago both cooked large quanti-
ties of pork at one time and held the ready-to-eat product
in a hot-holding unit; improper holding temperatures could
allow growth of any Salmonella organisms that survived
cooking. Second, food workers cut or weighed the ready-
to-eat product before sale at both establishments, and such
contact introduces another potential source of contamina-
tion. Third, both investigations cited sources of potential
DISPATCHES
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Figure 1. Outbreak-associated Salmonella enterica serotype
Uganda case-patients by date of illness onset, New York City
(NYC) (shaded bars) and Chicago (clear bars), June–September,
2001. Onset date was not given for one NYC case-patient who
attended an event at which pork from the implicated restaurant
was served. Encircled bullet denotes those who recalled eating
pork from the implicated NYC restaurant; asterisk denotes those
who recalled eating carnitas from the implicated Chicago grocery.cross-contamination of cooked product by raw meat. In
Chicago, butchers who handled raw meat also served cus-
tomers, and scales were used to weigh raw meat as well as
cooked carnitas. Use of the same knives, cutting boards, or
other utensils could have contributed to contamination of
the ready-to-eat product in either outbreak. S. Uganda was
isolated from the stool of one of the Chicago butchers;
whether he contributed to disease transmission is unclear.
However, infected food workers who do not practice prop-
er hygiene could have played a part in these outbreaks.
Previous reports of pork-associated salmonellosis out-
breaks have noted the importance of adequately reheating
cooked pork if time lapses between preparation and con-
sumption (9,10). Had the pork implicated in the outbreaks
been reheated to an internal temperature of 165°F (74°C),
the S. Uganda infections likely could have been prevented.
A common source was not implicated in the New York
City and Chicago outbreaks, but the experience under-
scores the potential for Salmonella transmission through
contaminated ready-to-eat pork products, the importance
of PFGE in Salmonella outbreak investigations even when
the serotypes involved are rare, and the utility of the Epi-
X system to alert local health departments and facilitate
data-sharing.
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Figure 2. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis profiles. Lanes 1, 8, 14,
and 20, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention standard;
lanes 2, 3, and 5, New York City nonoutbreak-associated clinical
Salmonella enterica serotype Uganda (SU) case isolates; lanes 4,
6, and 9–13, New York City outbreak–associated clinical SU case
isolates; lane 7, SU isolate obtained from leftover roast pork from
wedding; lanes 15–19, Chicago outbreak-associated clinical SU
case isolates. 